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CONCEPT OF SCIENCE IN MAX WEBER
By Yuzo DEGUCHI
(I)
 In the social sciences, what is represented by concept, proposition, 
or law with regard to their respective research objects is a remarkably 
elemental, and yet final question, which always challenges us for solu-
tion. According to the standpoints taken in answering the question, 
one concept will give birth to such a variety of considerations that, 
when it is taken up for a joint discussion, the natural consequence is 
that the participants will be pitted against each other as if they were 
as many people from diffierent planets. It is certainly true of a 
basic concept of 'price' in political economy, for instance. To the 
so-called modern theorists it seems that 'price' is the most general 
and unified expression of the various phrases of economic life, and at 
the same time the common denominator of all things from which they 
start and to which they are reduced. The backgronnds of 'price', 
they think, are technique or the social relations of mankind as such 
of which essence could not be covered by economic life alone, and it 
is the circumstances presupposed by political economy as existing 
outside its own field. Standing upon this premise, it may be considered 
that political economy has only to pay attention to both mechanics 
of 'price' and movement from 'price' to 'price'. And it will naturally 
so happen that the very premise is left for consideration to the hands 
of other sciences such as science of techinique, sociology, and so on. 
To marxists, on the other hand, 'price' is an actual form of the 
social 'value' of men engaged in the production of commodities. On 
one side, 'value' can not but project itself in the form of money, on 
that account the essence of 'value' can be clarified through money 
and in which are found in a general and unified way the various phases 
of economic life. On the other side, however, so far as 'value' assumes 
a special form of money, which is a social fetish, it is understood 
that the actual form of 'value' does not represent the essence of 
 'value' and accordingly the mecha
nics of 'price' are nothing more 
than an inverted form of the social relations of humanity as shown
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in terms of 'value'. And when price is understood as a unification 
of these two contradictory forms, the productive relations of capitalism, 
where phases of economic life are as a whole represented as movements 
of 'price', will be grasped dialectically, namely, affirmatively and 
negatively. From this standpoint, the productive relations of capitalism 
are not in the least the premise, whose consideration, as from the 
former standpoint, should be refered to other sciences, but on the 
contrary they are just the real field to be considered by political economy 
itself. That is to say, they have historical existance as one of the 
milestones in the development of economic life, and it is just the 
task of political economy to grasp them dynamically in their historical 
perspectives. However, by saying to grasp them as one of the mile-
stones of development, it is not meant that the social backgrounds of 
'price' are to be grasped actualy and concretely. The productive 
relations of capitalism are not to be grasped in terms of actual and 
individual character, but purified by man's faculty of abstraction into 
a scheme which is composed of various factors in the basic trend of 
economic development. Setting aside this significant commentary, it 
can be said from the standpoint of Marxism that behind price exists 
'value', and 'value' representing the social relations in economic life, 
deeply contains within it the field of political economy itself. It is 
only natural therefore that the concept of 'price' is defferent from 
the two standpoints and these two standpoints are like strangers to each 
other so far as this concept is concerned. It is also only natural that, 
whatever synthesis should be undertaken between the modern economic 
theory and the Marxian economics, it will inevitably be very incongruous. 
 That is not all. Between the standpoint which seems to be content 
with leaving to the hands of other sciences what lies behind the move-
ments, of 'price', and the standpoint which tries to take the said 
premise into the field of political economy, there may well be considered 
much difference to a life-attitude toward the premise. The above 
statement will immediately remind one of ideological criticism on 
these two economic sciences. Such a criticism is truly significant 
indeed, but it alone does ant settle the matter, to be sure. Some 
explanation will be necessary for its clarification. Generally, scientific 
 questions, as far as they are scientific, will not only reflect directly 
interests of life, even if the questions have originally raised by them, 
 but rather be raised in order to obtain through interests of life the 
knowledge which was not relevant to them. However, the irrelevancy 
of interests is not caused for irrelevance' sake, but on the contrary 
so in order to become really the stuff of life in a deeper sense of the
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 word and to obtain the higher degree of modus vivendi by being 
 irrelevant, and on that account separated and abstracted from the 
 direct interests of life. By becoming impractical and by receding from 
 daily practice, scientific answers will contribute toward the repletion 
and enhancement of practical life, and by becoming theoretical (con-
templative) they will serve a final rationalization of practice in life. 
Being separated and abstracted from the interests of life is no more 
than to negate reality once, but by so doing to serve in the reverse 
the progress of human reality. What is, then, the meaning of this 
separation and abstraction? The writer thinks, it means that it plays 
a role of negative mediation. Science is: a term of the negative 
mediation of human reality. Therefore, the so-called ideological 
criticism, though significant in grasping the motif of the generation of 
scientific thinking, is after all a kind of relativism. The essence of 
scientific thinking lies in that passing over the relativity of the gene-
rative motif while the thinking is connected with the absolute in some 
sense. However, the absolute here is never to be generated beyond the 
relative, but rather is along the line of the relative. It is, to tell the truth, 
relative=absolute. And, on that account, though science negatively 
mediates with reality, that mediation will take place with reference to 
life interests or modus vivendi. In this sense, the modus vivendi 
which serves the generation of scientific questions will again grant an 
essential character to scientific argument. This character is not only 
given by mere social existence -- individual, family, city, rural com-
munity, class, race, etc., but appears itself as the horizontal extent in 
the ontological society as well as the depth of significance taken from 
 reality; that is to say, the ontological character of which value will 
be determined on the objective grounds where science is to be evaluated. 
 Thus, it is in a double role of the motive of scientific generation and 
the motif of scientific mediation with reality that an ontological life-
attitude will be significant to scientific theory. -- The above argument 
has been made in an attempt to -consider the abstract character of 
concept ontologically or from the angle of the logic of existence. 
 If the relation of science to life briefly mentioned above is admitted, 
it will then be seen that the standpoints of the two economic sciences 
 regarding 'value' are much more different in their life-attitudes than 
in their fields, and the former difference must be considered in the 
light of scientific theory. The modern theory which seems content 
 with leaving the examination of the very back-ground of 'price' to 
the hands, of other sciences maintains that its limited field should be 
existent within reality as a relatively independent unit as 'market'
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for example; and in order that 'market' may be such and able to be 
such, 'market' itself should have self-sufficiency, and the significance 
(Sinn) of self-sufficiency is that it can exist even independent of other 
fields. This independent significance must be, however, such as can 
be apprehended by researchers in their practical life only when they 
are conscious that the movements of price in 'market' are neither 
disturbed by other phenomena nor interfering with them. The reason 
is that if the said significance be considered so contradictorily related 
to others as to be interfered with by others and at the same time 
disturb others, it cannot be considered as independent and self-sufficient, 
and therefore it must have something to do with others before it may 
be considered one existence. In order that 'market' may have an 
independent significance, not to mention of the necessity of the 
abstraction from its historical conceretness--abstraction from history 
is indispensable to theory -- it is highly necessary that its own 
significance should be kept intact in the process of abstraction to 
theoretical rationality, and again in order that the significance may be 
kept undestroyed, it must not be losing harmony with other significances 
in the process of abstraction. It is just by that means that 'market' 
can be determined as an independent field. From the standpoint of 
Marxism, however, such an abstraction of theory as mentioned above 
could not be permitted. The reason is that the 'market' where move-
ments of 'price' exist is a field where historical productive relations 
comes into being, and so to think by breaking off and detracting the 
productive relations from the field is nothing more than the detracting 
 from its very relation with 'value' as well as the losing of sociological 
thinking. Generally 'market' cannot have 'significance' unless kept 
in close contact with productive relations. This maintenance is impo-
ssible before the confirmation is made that abstraction to 'market' 
should be conducted, as containing in it contradictions of the capitalistic 
society, and on that acchunt 'market' alone cannot be considered 
independent. In short, here the mechanics and movements of 'price', 
when detracted from productive relations, will become 'insignificant' 
 (Sinnlos), because in the movements of 'price' the harmony of social 
existence in the above-mentioned sense is not admitted to exist. 
 As seen from the above instance, the concept and other thinking 
implements in the social sciences are generally to be established through 
a double abstraction of empirical realities. By a double abstraction it 
is meant as follows : firstly, it means that social phenomenon, object 
of the social sciences, which is sensibly concrete, individual, and always 
subject to variation, has lost or detracted from its concreteness,
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individuality, and variablity in its concept. By means of this detraction 
 Or abstraction, concept is always granted generality and constancy. 
This abstraction, which the writer called above abstraction from his-
torical concreteness, may-well be renamed abstraction from positiveness. 
In any case, it is 'abstraction from', by which economic reality is 
 somewhat altered in thinking. Secondly, the concept established by 
 'abstraction from' will further be subjected to abstraction in another 
sense. The fact is that the concept in sciences is ever intended to 
come to systematic unification, and science fundamentally requires 
rationality throughout the unification. A rational order is in the last 
analysis a system, and whether or not able to crystalise itself into 
such a system, the concept is always intended for a rational order. 
And this intention will inevitably accompany abstraction to rationality. 
This abstraction may be called 'abstraction to'. In 'abstaction to', 
empirical reality will achieve a higher degree of abstraction and receive 
the more alteration. Thus a double abstraction of ' abstraction from ' 
and 'abstraction to' resides between empirical reality and scientific 
concept. 
 Whenever we encounter any concept in social sciences, therefore, 
it is to be remembered that it has resulted from a double abstraction 
such as mentioned above. And when we handle concept and othe 
thinking implements, we will come in touch with empirical reality 
reversely in a double, concretion. That is to say, one is a concretion 
from rational order, or so to speak 'concretion from', and here the 
concept, drawing from general abstractness a step nearer to positive-
ness, will contain an empirical content, which is still only of a special 
kind, if any, and yet not of a concrete and individual category. So 
 further secondly, `concretion to positiveness ' will come to the fore 
and unless passing through the process of 'concretion to', the concept 
would not return to the empirical reality itself. The empirical. reality 
thus found, however, is not the chaotic empirical variety of an 
 original one but a rational reality arranged more or less under a 
rational order. And now by means of scientific concept we may be 
able to grasp empirical reality as rationalized.' Therefore again, based 
on this, a rational formation of empirical reality itself may be expected. 
 Science has the two basic requirements of positiveness and ratio-
nality, which are in fact too much in conflict with each other to be 
easily satisfied. Scientific thinking is at all times confronted with the 
problem of how to meet these two conflicting requirements. And as 
indicating the procedures to solve this problem may be considered the
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above-mentioned logical relation concerning reality and the concept 
and other thinking implements. A double abstraction and a double 
concretion may be renamed with good reason as 'an upward movement 
 from empirical reality to thinking implements' and 'a downward 
movements from thinking implements to empirical reality' respectively, 
and through these two movements there will be met two requirements 
of positiveness and rationality in scientific cognition. Therefore episte-
mology in social sciences should be developed centering around these 
two movements. In order that such a development of epistomology 
may be made possible, there must lurk behind it the circumstances 
affecting real existence, that is, the relation between experience and 
thinking or life and cognition, and their ontological grasp must be 
presupposed. The reason is that real existence is the inclusive and 
concrete situation from which science starts and to which science 
returns. From various standpoints of social sciences, therefor, there 
first precede certain viewpoints concerning the relation between experi-
ence and thinking or life and cognition-otherwise called the relation 
between practice and theory-and then based upon them there will be 
developed an epistemology, which is no more than to make clear the 
above mentioned logical system of both 'upward' and 'downward' move-
ments between empirical reality and thinking implements. And thru this 
 system, the two scientific requirements of positiveness and rationality 
will be satisfied.
In the following, consideration has been given to the problem of
how the above-mentioned logical relations were sloved by Max Weber. 
It is from this angle that the writer has probed into Weber's scientific 
methodology.
(II)
 In treating Max Weber's scientific theory, it is necessary, as 
 indicated by the above-mentioned introductory argument, to consider 
it in its vivid connection with Weber's life. As referred to above, 
science, as produced by the abstractive powers of man, also arises 
 from his practical relation with empirical reality. To put it otherwise, 
the said relation will be once negated into a rational system of concept, 
and then 'the concept, returning to the reality, first abstractly shows 
its develonmental line and then give a concrete form to the line
through man's practice, thereby realizing the development of reality, 
and in that sense negatively mediating empirical reality. So viewed, 
it follows that scientific theory, even if pierced by conceptive thinking 
and in that sense offered as not directly related to various phases of
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life, will certainly have behind itself in the abstract form the life of 
the advocate of the sientific theory ; and it is thus only by the two 
actions of 'abstraction from' life and 'abstraction to' system that 
scientific theory is made possible as such. Saying so may perhaps give 
rise to some questions about the objectivity of scientific theory. Some 
one will ask as follows. If its connection with the life of its advocate 
must be considered, there will be taken an issue of nothing but the 
relation of the scientific theory either to the personality and subjectivity 
of a researcher which are concrete and separate or to the social con-
ditions of a specific time and place; and after all there will be made 
clear only individuality, subjectivity, class nature, racial and historical 
characteres of the scientific theory to the loss of its objective raison 
 d'etre. Originally, scientific theory, apart from whatever subjective 
 conditions of its researcher as well as whatever social conditeons of 
his environment, would exist as an objective thought; and therefore it 
may be considered that so far as theory is called scientific it is non-
sensical unless it be treated apart from subjectivity. As a matter of 
fact, the writer once saw a young student of Max Weber's theory of 
science telling about his impression, when he read an existentialistic 
interpretation of Weber, that it took issue with 'subjectivity in the 
cognition of social sciences' rather than 'objectivity in the cognition 
of social sciences', thus losing sight of Weber's proper intention. 
 However, any dobut or suspicion like this, reasonable as it may 
seem at first sight, has failed in fact to fully understand the writer's 
argument. By saying that scientific theory must be grasped in its 
vivid connection with the life of its researcher, it is not only meant 
that various propositions shall be reduced to all private and social 
conditions related to the formation of the scientific theory so as to 
find the reasons for producing the propositions. It is one of private 
or social interpretations of scientific theory -- so is an ideological 
interpretation --, accordingly it must inevitably result in such a 
criticism. Far from it, the understanding of scientific theory in 
connection with the subjective and objective conditions of its 
researcher will actually serve to clarify in what way the objectivity 
of scientific theory is made possible and to what extent, just for 
reason of the objectivity, cognition in social sciences will come to act 
as negative mediation of empirical reality. And it is in the following 
sense. -- A researcher coming in touch with an empirical reality 
may surely encounter in his observation or personal experience some 
contents which are historically variable, socially limited, and full 
of personal equations. And he will proceed with his mediation
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along the line of the contents. Whatever a broad knowledge of the 
 objective world he may get -- it must be an endeavour indispensable to 
a researcher -- so as to get rid of the contingency and finiteness of 
the said contents, the subjectivity or finiteness of the knowledge, as 
long as one who unifies the contents of such a broad knowledge remains 
the same person, it cannot possibly be negated. Rather, on the contrary, 
by the broad knowledge the separate subjectivity or individuality in 
personal experience will come to be the more strengthened. The 
contents of personal experience will be coloured by personal charac-
teristics. Thus, to the more accumulation of the contents of objective 
experience is denied the way of getting rid of subjectivity. The way 
of obtaining objectivity must be rather expected of the abstracting 
process of the contents. This abstracting process is, as mentioned 
above, of two kinds; and in the rationalizing process experience will be 
generalized and universalized by negating itself along the line of 
its own concrete and separate contents. The proposal of 'the 
individual is the general', as Hegel said, is made possible as far 
as this abstracting process-rationalizing process is the negation of the 
contents of personal experience. Thus concept and other thinking 
implements come to light and by their obtaining of universality the 
objectivity of the sientific theory will be established. It may further 
be said that in accordance with the greatness of universality possessed 
by concept and others, the greatness of the objectivity, namely, the 
methodological value, of the scientific theory is determined. .That the 
writer wants to understand scientific theory in its vivid connection 
with life is with a view to not only reducing scientific theory to 
its generating reasons but also probing as to how a rationalizing abst-
raction has been made from the individual generating reasons and to 
what extent objectivity has been obtained. The writer might be said 
therefore undertaking the reproduction-from-life of scientific theory. 
In other words, the writer intends not only to see the reduction to 
subjectivity, but rather to ascertain how much scientific theory has 
done in the line of objectification rearranging itself reversely from the 
last point reached in the line of subjectification. Thus, the examination 
of scientific theory in the light of its vivid connection with life contains 
within it the two operations of, firstly, the reduction of concept and 
other thinking implements to their positive contents and, secondly, the 
rationalizing return from positivity to the concept and other thinking 
implements. And by dint of this return it will be made clear in what 
way conceptive order in methodology has contained positivity in it
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and to what extent it has taken in reality.--Thus it is just by the 
failure of understanding this later operation and its meaning that the 
doubt mentioned above has been brought to the light. 
 Now, from the writer's standpoint of scientific theory, an important 
thing stands out. That is that whatever rationalization may be con-
ducted and whatever universality and objectivity may be obtained 
by the abstraction in concept and others, the rationality and objectivity 
are in the last analysis nothing less than formal. The very content 
regarded rational and objective, namely, its essence will inevitably 
reside in the very personal and social conditions which are discovered 
as the result of reduction toward subjectification. Thus after all, the 
final substantial grounds for the objectivity of scientific theory are to 
be found within the subjective body of a researcher and the objective 
conditions which surround it. And this is made possible either on the 
strength that the universal resides in the personal or on the basis of 
the philosophical or metaphysical truth of reality that the universal 
appears itself through the individual person. In short, objectivity of 
scientific theory is in fact along the line of subjectivity. To put it 
more clearly, objectivity is along the line of the way a researcher's 
subjective body acts as a social being. The writer thinks that objectivity 
of science should strictly be called subjective=objectivity in this sense. 
 Before closing the introduction, a little further comment will be 
added on this subjective=objectivity. What underlies the theory of 
social sciences is found in nothing other than the contents of social 
reality daily experienced by the subjective body of a researcher reflec-
ting over social reality. And the contents are infinitely diverse and 
disorderly within the sphere of the empirical knowlege of the researcher, 
and may well reflect objective conditions of the society. However, 
the contents expressed in a concept are always somewhat orderly and 
given some unification. In the subjective body of a researcher, at any 
rate, the infinitely diverse contents are arrayed in a definite order as 
empirical knowledge. If so, it means not only the reflection of objective 
conditions in the subject but also their being controled under the 
thinking ability of the subjective body and metamorphosed subjective 
body. Therefore, empirical knowledge is not merely subjective, but 
truly unified in reference to subjectiv body. Cognition of social sciences 
will start with this subjectified empirical knowledge. And by the double 
abstraction mentioned above, the contents of knowledge will be rational-
ized as well as objectified. Therefore, objectivity of scientific knowledge 
is not formed quite independent of subjectivity, but on the contrary 
for the formation of objectivity, subjectivity will take its place the
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more deeply. That is the reason why objectivity must be, in fact, 
 subjective=objectivity. This is to be made the clearer by considering 
the practical character of social sciences. There is no need to dwell 
 on the necessity for social sciences to make arguments of policy-- 
 the crux of the mater is rather the methodological sense of the 
argument, and it is also true of Weber's theory--, but how are they 
made possible? If the arguments are to have subjective=objectivity 
in the above sense, they ought to be essentially not irrelevant to the 
subjective body, but have with it the possibility of subjectification. 
Propositions have the potentiality of being subjectified, thus becoming 
a guiding power for actions of the subjective body, and being shifted 
to subjective practice. They are not, as it were, a tower built on 
the sand by personal desire, fancy, or ambition, but possess an 
objective value, because they contain subjective=objectivity. Thus, 
the subjective argument, by being subjectified and realised, will grant 
man an objective subjectivity. Accordingly, that the argument is realized 
in various social conditions does not mean the realization of the 
 subject's desire. fancy, or ambition, but the participation: of the argu-
ment in the develoymental formation of social reality.
 The.above may be considered as too long for an introduction, but 
the writer wishes to get the readers' understanding of his standpoint 
And from this standpoint, consideration will be given to Max Weber's 
scientific theory. 
 (III)
 It is already a well-known fact that Max Weber was by nature so 
fond of political and practical activities that while as a scientist 
attaining brilliant achievements, particularly since the time when the 
prospect of the World War I was becoming clear, he was very active 
as a political commentator. As for the problem of the relation of 
politics to science in Weber, which has been already discussed in 
detail (e. g. Christoph Steding; Politik and Wissenschaft bei Max 
 Weber, 1932), his existence as a politician, giving a decisive direction 
to all his scholastic activities concerning matters not only in political 
science but of sientific theory and social sciences, is plainly reflected 
in their very respective theories. The writer also agrees with Steding 
on his theme. 
 Here the writer does not wish to elaborate on Weber's political 
activities, his works as a political commentator, and his position in 
political science. The job may be left to the hands of some more 
suitable person. Only the matter will be briefly explained so as to
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be instrumental in the better understanding of the following statements. 
Weber had inherited two sets of character traits--from his father 
who was a bourgeoistic politician anxious for power and pleasure in 
the world, and from his mother, who, filled with the religious senti-
ments of the Protestants and preoccupied with charity and philanthropy, 
 seemed to have so-called vocational morals of Protestantism, -- 
 among his forefathers on the mother's side was an Huguenot engaged 
in a wholesale business. These hereditary tendencies were not united 
so easily, rather the conflict between them was the greatest problem 
to be solved in his younger days. At last, however, his familiarity 
with the home life of the relatives on his mother's side, while he was 
in the army, came to make the influence of the maternal character 
stronger. And it can be said that the worldly man's needs were inter-
nalized and deepened into an ethical view of life, and at the same time 
reversely again religous internality was externalized to be sociality, 
deciding thus the realisation of the ethos of Protestantism as his later 
life attitude. 
 This includes the following fact. It is that life attitude was pene-
trated with the rationalistic way of thinking which had also traditionally 
characterised the Christian theology in Europe. The highly vulgarized 
ethos of Protestantism will come to be, therefore, the demand for the 
emancipation of the world from megic (Entzauberung der Welt). This 
is the basic objective of Weber's life. And this objective is composed 
of two sides. One side is a firm determination to practically rationalize 
the social environment, by dispelling all kinds of magic and mystery. 
Max Weber fought for democratic rationalization of society, 
incessantly offering criticism on the Second Empire of Germany, under 
which he was brought up and whose prosperity he celebrated, as well 
as on the feudalistic and bureaucratic social system of his fatherland. 
And again it was due to the said determination that he leveled a 
methodological criticism at the historical school of social sciences. 
However, this criticism of objective body or object would not be made 
perfect without the endorsement of criticism on the subjective side, 
namely, self-criticism. (All criticism cannot be worthy of the name 
unless they are the simultaneous criticism on both sides of subject and 
 object.) Self-criticism will in the field of practical life assume 
the form of ethical criticism. Here, to establish self i. e. ethical 
self was a practical problem that Weber imposed upon himself. 
He, who indignantly took legal action against a news-reporter 
who fabricated a groundless report to be circulated regarding the
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 woman's movement with which his wife was connected; he who 
answered with a cool refusal towards German youths regarding him 
as a racial leader; he who raised the requests for modern politicians 
by lecturing on 'Politics as a Vocation' -- these facts were certainly no 
more than the outcome of a practical self-criticism based on Kantian 
view of morals. Again., criticism of self will theoretically assume the 
 form of self-reflexions on cognizing-subject. The request for these 
 relflexions was evident equally in him who had to and could lecture 
on 'Science as a Vocation' as well as in his scientific theory which 
aimed at dispelling both faith and world outlook from the subject of 
 scientific cognition. Thus, over the requests of these two sides, his 
objective of life, the emancipation of the world from magic, was able 
to be set up. And that this . objective had to mean the emancipation 
of self from magic as well will not be difficult to grasp from what 
the writer has. said above. 
 How then were these two requests satisfied? In answer to these, 
what self was practically and theoretically established for his self? 
To what degree did the historical reality around him make a develop-
mental formation by dint of his character? To what extent did his 
cloudless scientific cognition grasp the truth of historical reality? 
These may be of course subjects for discussion. Ameng these, however, 
the writer will limit the matter to scientific theory. 
 To begin with, what did Weber think about the relation between 
life or practice and cognition or theory? The writer has mentioned 
above that already in his younger days Weber's view of life was 
decided as ethical--it was in truth subjective idealism (subjectiver 
Idealismus) from the view-point of the types of world views. This line 
he developed unflinchingly all his life. So his views on life and 
cognition must have already been announced earlier. For such views 
of his we should refer to his two letters in his younger days. 
 One of them was the letter dated July 5, 1887 and addressed to 
his cousin Emmy Baumgarten, in  which he admonished her not to pass 
judgment on moral value by concept of understanding. Moral consi-
ousness, that is, "one person's consiousness of responsibility for his 
 own action will not be based on consiousness of understanding, and 
accordingly will be neither composed nor repulsed by understanding". 
 " Standing just here at the limit of the conceptive ability of man
, we 
enter into quite a different world where quite a different .side of our 
mind will try to make the evaluation of things. And it is well known 
by all that the judgment of that side, in spite of being based on no 
concept of understanding, is as accurate and clear as the logical tem
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of inference brought forth by understanding", (Max Weber, Jugendbriefe. 
p. 258, 261. The excerpts from the letter appear also in 'Max Weber, 
 Ein Lenbensbild', p. 166, 167.) These words of his certainly account 
for the standpoint of the young Weber who accepted the Kantian 
distinction between theoretical reason and practicul reason, and his 
argument that a scientific attitude and a practical attitude of moral 
or political category lie in two different worlds may directly be con-
nected with the request for 'nonvaluation' (Wertfreileit) in scientific 
theory. In the next place, in the letter dated Augast 5 of the same 
year to his younger brother Alfred, he answerd the brother's complaint 
about the difficulty of theoretical comprehension, warning him of his 
 'excessive evalution of conceptive cognition' and sa
ying at the same 
time that theory was always tied with 'premise', and though by it a 
parson may be often made inclined to behave negatively toward theory, 
it will not on that account affect his evaluation of theory. (Jugendbriefe, 
p. 263-265) These words are indicative of Weber's having noticed the 
one-sidedness of theoretical cognition. The optimism that all reality 
could be grasped by theory was made possible either from the stand-
point of natural law in the 18 th century-- where was found a mixing 
up of empirical science and metaphysics--or from the standpoint 
of Hegel's pan-logistic metaphysics -- there the point was the 
reconciliation of theory with reality. However, it was a sort of 
pessimism rather than such optimism that Weber held toward theory. 
It was an idea that by theory of science not the whole of reality 
could be grasped, while on the contrary scientific cognition was at 
all times tied with a certain ' premise ' and on that account' no more 
than finite either in the scope of objects or in being concerned with 
the human objects. The breaking off from a world view or metap-
hysics, and the peculiarity of . the character of theory -- were the 
requirements and requests like these not already budding forth even in 
the wording of these letters? 
 It is obvious that these two requests that young Weber held 
toward the thinking and theory based on concept of understanding 
could not be proposed unless the 'subject' (or self) of the scientist 
Weber be established behind the requests. The establishment of the 
subject could be made by establishing the subjective body as a con-
ductor of responsible morals on one hand and as a place of conflict 
among different systems of world views and metaphsics, or as an un-
flinching fighter in political conflict on the other hand; and in accor-
dance with the degree to which the subject is established, 'clearness' 
will be obtained in scientific cognition. I  this case, as the reader
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will see, objectivity of cognition will be along the line of subjectivity. 
 How did he, then, make his debut with his scientific theory in the 
academic world? The examination of the nature of his problem 
regarding scientific theory had better be started with this question. 
There is almost no doubt that the conclusion of a wonderfully huge 
and extensive survey and historical study made in a short time was 
'National State and National Economic Policy' (1895), his inauguration 
lecture at the Freiburg University. There we can see Weber's concein 
at the time and the line of its solution. (For detailed analysis of this 
thesis refer to the writer's work, 'Economics and Historical Sense') 
There he made an issue of the circumstances that the living conditions 
of German immigrants within the country to the east of River Elbe 
had caused a deplorable situation for the development of the Second 
Empire. And after giving a conclusion of economic policy as to how 
to cope with that situation, he proceeded to discuss the question as 
to what standard of value is in economic policy and who in the German 
race should be a driving force of policy according to that standard. 
Here he answered point-blank to the questions, such as of the relation 
of theory to policy in political economy, the connection of politics 
with economics etc. The writer will not here refer to the 
respective matters. Only he wishes to draw the readers' attention 
to Weber's standpoint in regard to the theory of policy which made 
a counterpart of the above-mentioned negative atitude toward 
theory, by saing that in the said conclusion Weber raised nothing but 
a negative proposition regarding the agent of economic policy and stated 
an outwardly circuitous argument such as of the need of the political 
education of the German people. The noticeable point in connection 
with the foregoing statements ,is that the political enthusiasm of Max 
Weber as a citizen of the national state of Germany had come con-
cretely into the limelight. There it was stressed that interest in 
economic value should be subordinated to interest in political value. 
Weber's was the standpoint of raisond'Etar, that of Macchiavellism 
in a broader sense, but not of natural law. From the dark world of 
the interest of state power or Machtinteresse which was unrationalistic 
and distinct from the brightness of natural law, he evaluated economic 
life and drew a practical conclusion. As long as he stood on the 
standpoint of a scientist, however, he could not remain in the dark 
world. To set free the dark world from the magic of power desire, 
to rationalize power desire would naturally have become the next 
problem to solve. How was this problem to be solved? 
 According to F. Meinecke, we may be able to tell about the conflict
CONCEPT OF SCIENCE IN MAX WEBER 53
between ethos (ethics) and krathos (power) within the raison d'Etat. 
(F. Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsrason in neueren Geschichte, Einlei-
tung). Raison d'Etat is a world of mutual limitation between the 
darkness of krathos and the light of ethos, and even if modein states 
be replaced by a new from of human community, the raison d'Etat will 
certainly appear on the stage in a new dress. When Weber proclaimed 
that a final value standard of economic policy should be the raison 
d'Etat, he must have keenly felt there the existence of both darkness 
and light. And the rationalization of darkness, as evident from what 
has been discussed before, had to be carried on by the ethos coloured 
by a rationalistic factor in Christianity. Modem . states, at their start, 
were each established with their respective tsate reasons, but they 
developed from the stage of absolute monarchy to capitalistic and demo-
cratic stage. This national development was due to the ethos of 
Christianity, more properly, of Protestantism, tying with the bourgeoisie, 
which liberated the raison d'Etat from the dark and thus made the 
European world proceed toward a rational world. The task had to be 
kept up so as to realize the further vulgarization of that ethos in the 
succeeding times, and at the same time the relation of the ethos of 
 Protestantism to modern capitalism had to be studied looking back 
over the preceding times. And thus, as easily understood from the 
brief statement above, Weber's sociological study on control (Herrschaft) 
and his study on the 'spirit' of modern capitalism were necessarily 
the products derived from his practical objective.
(IV)
 Weber's scientific theory eventually bore fruit in the purification of 
the pessimistic line of epistemology expressed in the above-mentioned 
lecture. He believed then that so far as he is a scientist, he should not 
set up epistemology by looking down from the high place of philoso-
phical or metaphysical standpoint. The request of his conscience as a 
scientist dictated him to pursue a system of cognition from scientific 
knowledge itself. Therefore, Hegel's pan-logistic metaphysics and the 
historical metaphysics of the romantic school should not be effective in 
the solution of his problem. He was agreeable not with the philosophy-
'from above', but with the philosophy 'from below'. And an influen-
tial philosophy of the latter kind at that time was the Baden School 
of Neo-Kantianism which, opposing the philosophy which had been 
aiming at an expansion of the cognition of natural science, attempted 
to develop the epistemology of history from Kantian standpoint of 
cognition as against the epistemology of natural science. Weber
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 borrowed willingly from the theories of Rickert, among others, so as 
thus to purify and establish his own methodological standpoint. 
 How is the concept of ideal-type to be composed ? The following 
is a brief logical tracing of the composition of the concept. 
 Various phenomena we encounter in our social life are of inifinite 
variety and individuality, and we can not find within them a principle 
of consolidating and unifying them. Out of material itself a unifying 
principle will not be born. Rather the principle is no the side of the 
subjective body which comes in contact with those phenomena. And 
then, the subjective body as well is an individual who is at all times 
inescapably subjected to the limitation of time and space. Even if 
one human group happens to act as one subjective body and share a 
similar cognition cocerning social life, the generation of such a similar 
cognition must presuppose that an individual cognition precedes it and 
pass through some social operation in order to be similarized. Originally, 
 when an individual subjective body comes in contact with individual 
phenomena, the subjective body, through its knowing conduct, will 
take in, adapt itself to, or effect some alteration on, the phenomena, 
--that is the beginning of cognition in social sciences. Starting 
from that beginning, to cognize the individuality of the phenomena, 
to discover a universal order among them, and to find out the behavior 
norm of the subjective body responsive to them, in short, to carry out 
the thinking arrangement of empirical realities along the line of the 
practical action of men is nothing less than scientific cognition. And 
the reason why it is called scientific is that the manner of arrangement 
can not only satisfy the intellectual thirst of the persons engaged 
in the cognition, but at the same time meet that of others with similar 
convictions. That state can be attained not directly from the very 
phenomena, but through the establishment of cognizing subject as 
universal as well as separate or through the self-consciousness of the 
 subject as individual and at the same time universal. According to 
Weber, that was made possible when the subjective body was established 
as a crivized man --a man daily bathed in the culture of modern 
Europe--and at the same time when Weber himself was conscions 
as such. The civilized man acts with regard to various phases of 
European culture, connecting their respective value ideas of culture. 
Entertaining respective interests of value in those phases, he endeavors 
for the higher social realization of those values. And simultaneously, 
he tries not to lose at any moment an intellectual interest in grasping 
those phases along the line of their ideas of value. This intellectual 
interest, though being along the line of the practical interest in the
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realization of value, is actually quite different and independent interest. 
By becoming a separate, independent interest and having a cultual 
significance, it can serve the promotion of civilization, and at the same 
time make itself a great culture, or intellectual culture. And so far 
as scientific cognition is concerned, intellectual interest within it must 
be quite different from practical interest. Into it there must not be 
permitted to intervene all kinds of interests of evaluation, whether 
moral interest or political interest. Rather, the very problem of how 
these interests as well are able to evaluate must be considered under 
an intellectual interest alone. Thus a civilizaed man will come to be 
determined as a possessor of intellectual interest, 'a thinking researcher'. 
 However, under this determination alone, a general person to cognize 
may be established, but there is not yet established a general person 
to cognize scientifically or to engage in cognition of empirical science. 
For that purpose, there will further need to determine him as one who 
engages in the systematic arrangement of empirical knowledge. The 
systematic arrangement of empirical knowledge is made possible only 
by ever keeping ones eyes from empirical contents and observing the 
cultural significance of the contents themselves, and only by deisting 
from reading their significance in what is considered to be a super 
-empirical source which exists behind that cultural significance. The 
reason is that the latter will interfere with attaining the objective of 
empirical science. Though, to a concretely behaving individual, em-
pirical knowledge may, only when always supported by the super 
-empirical, become material for practical purposes, the cognizing sub-
jectivity of empirical science would not be qualified for such before it 
has some support behind it. Thus it is only when irrelevant to 
metaphysics, world-view, or life-view that the cognizing subjectivity 
of empirical science may be established. 
 This establishment of subject would not be made possible without the 
establishment of it as such within Max Weber himself, that is, without 
Weber's self-consciousness of it. And this self-consciousness must 
not have been made except with reference to the historical, social 
conditions in which Weber's personality was placed. As a matter of 
fact, Weber become conscious of it as a man living in the sphere of 
European culture in the 19 th century. Though in Germany it some-
times happened to be clouded, in both Western Europe and America 
the empirical scientific subject of an individual exists as a fact of 
reality, because there the rational formation of society has been carried 
on, and culture has been created on the basis of the free activities of 
individuals. Here, the above abstract subject is based on reality.
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That is-not all. This subject drawn out of Cultural persons of modern 
Europe should be not only be available in Europe, but further have 
the character of internationality. Though rationalization, namely, 
the emancipation of the world from magic has been conducted 
only in Europe, the world should be rationalized, and even if magical 
restraints predominantly bind cultural spheres other than Europe, 
it is not because these spheres are in essence categorically repulsive 
to rationalization, but only. because they remain in the yet unrationalized 
stage. Therefore, so far as people there are awakened to the line of 
rationalization -- man originally should be so --, even if magic still 
predominates there, the above subject of empirical sience should be 
made possible abstractly (scientifically). Therefore, it may be said with 
reason that the subject drawn out of cultural persons in modern Europe 
is universal all over the world. It is not to be overlooked that such 
a firm belief in the internationality of European culture has become 
the Endorsement of Weber's cognizing subject. 
 What significance has this self-determindtion of cognizing subject? 
The process of abstraction that a practical subjective body will reach 
the merely cognizing body by throwing away moral and political 
interest, breaking off with world-view, and getting one side of Empirical 
reality related to the idea of value -- such a process may be consi-
dered a thorough retreat from the concrete, practical subjective. body. 
 It may be said to be almost similar to the case of Kant where subject 
in theoretical cognition was established by retreating from an Empirical 
perceptive person to general consciousness (Bewusstsein ueberhaupt). 
And it may not be amiss to say that as Kant laid epistemological 
foundations for classical physics, so Weber did to capitalistic economics. 
In the social sciences, as distinict from in the natural sciences, object 
and subject being very complicated in contents, the retreat to the 
 above-mentioned 'thinking researcher' is much more complicated than 
the general consciousness draw n out in Kant. Though it may seem 
established by detracting all the historical and social conditions from 
the cognizing subject, in fact it is not the case; in some sense 
the conditions remain purified in the thinking researcher. In the first 
place, this 'thinking researcher' is characteristically an individual. 
With Weber even the social phenomena of the time, when the awake-
ning of individuality was not yet realized, and lay buried in some 
social group, will be grasped, first as cognized by an individual, and 
then as losing gradually the individuality into the generality of group 
consciousness. Of course it is not what we call the story of Robinson, 
but making a model of Robinson, the above thinking has grasped the
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past ages up to him as the undeveloped stages thereto. In short, 
Weber's cognizing subject was established with modern individual as 
a model. Saying so, the writer does not mean that by it man before 
modern ages can not be grasped. In consideration of man, it is very 
profitable of course first to analyze the current developmental phases 
and then to retrospect on the past. However, not to mention that 
the historical character of a modern individual cannot possibly be 
understood by the mere consideration that he is the final point of 
development from the past, it is perhaps not to be grasped fully even 
by the historical idea that an individual may, in future, change his 
significance in social life. Far from it, though the significance of an 
individual is indistinctly changeable, the historical nature of an indivi-
dual in the true sense seems to be cognized correctly, when it has 
come to be already foreshadowed in a basic point. In the case of 
Weber, an individual has already been socially established, only belong-
ing to his existing being or Gewordensein, and the image of its own 
future change has not in any sense foretold. Accordingly this subject 
cannot be established except as one who engages in the critical self 
-interpretation of the existing modern individual. However, the true 
subject in the social sciences must be established as one whe forms 
himself developmentally only by determining himself critically, and at 
the same time be a universal person who has been given energe for 
 advancement reversely by the retreat of a real person to an abstract 
 'researcher' . Thus, Weber's subject must be respected for its thorough 
self-restraint, but simultaneously seems to be defective in an important 
point. 
 In the second place, within Weber's scientific subject a definite 
image of the world is premised. As already seen, the world constitutes 
an arena of eternal conflicts for power among racial states, and at the 
same time presents a picture of the modern European culture acting 
as the spearhead and other cultural spheres following it as subordinates. 
This image of the world has been held equally by thinkers in the 
modern Europe, and is an image of the existing world. Weber considered 
this as a world which, liberated from magic, proceeds toward rationali-
zation. This world has been in fact emancipated from magic by 
individualistic rationalization, and by its develoyrnent the racial conflicts 
as well will be expected to distinguish. To Weber there is considered 
no other world than that which should be the last along this line. 
His scientific subject has in the last analysis been established with 
the intention of making a critical interpretation of the modern world, 
and will not participate in the formation of a new image of the world
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quite different from the modern one. Is it not truly necessary, however, 
that behind cognizing-subject of the social sciences an intention for 
such an image of new world is deeply contained? As seen above, in 
the subject established by Weber lies the intention of self-interpretation 
of the given existing man and world, and in this regard also, it seems 
to contain an important problem to be criticized. 
 The way the cognizing subject acts determines the character of 
the cognition itself. Objectivity of cognition is established along the 
line of the establishment of the subject. That is what they call the 
objectivity of the cognition by means of ideal type. In what sense 
then was enpirical reality rationalized by it? There is no need here 
to explain as to how what is called ideal-type is formed, what part it 
will play, and of what character the cognition by means of ideal-type 
is possessed. (cf. the writer's work 'Economics and Historical Sence') 
From the angle indicated above, this question alone will be briefly 
handled as follows. 
 The ideal-type can be compared to spectacles. It is the spectacles 
for arranging in thinking the chaotic contents of empirical knowledge. 
There 'abstraction from' positivity means simultaneously 'abstraction 
to' rationality. For one thing, the former is that, as regards the 
matters connected with a certain idea of value, the subject who is 
inquiring after a cultural significance of the said idea selects empirical 
knowledge and sets them into one group. The group has some rational 
character. For another thing, the latter is obtained by forming out 
of that group of phenomena the image of idea, which has no contra-
diction in its contents. Formerly in the case of J. S. Mill, social 
sciences were considered to need the two processes of ratiocination 
and verification (J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, Book VI), while in 
the case of Weber these two operations are unified. The reason is 
that the 'abstraction from' empirical contents, being carried on 
concerning rational representation, will have the significance of 'abst-
raction to' rational ideal-type while holding on to positivity. By such 
unification, the historical character of empirical knowledge will be 
expressed in the very ideal-type, causing the keener consciousness of 
the historical character of cognition, and at the same time the 
positive knowledge of history will become scientific, the cognition of 
historical character, accordingly, the epistemology of history being thus 
obtained there. In the case of Weber, as different from in the case 
of Mill, the distinction between 'direct deductive method' and 'reverse 
deductive method or historical method' will disappear itself. This may 
well be said to be Weber's great advantage over Mill's methodology.
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 However, this double abstraction in the formation of ideal-type 
concept is a little different from what the writer mentioned above. 
By 'abstraction to' rationalization, empirical knowledge will be trans-
formed into rational knowledge or, according to Weber, nomothetisches 
 Wissen, but the writer thinks that it does not merely reflect empirical 
reality rationally or intelligibly, but in the very cognition will come 
to reside a creative force which will developmentally form empirical 
reality along the line of the greater rationalization. Speeking figura-
tively as above, scientific cognition might be considered as spectacles 
which give creative indications to the wearer. In the case of Weber, 
however, that ability is not certainly granted to scientific cognition. 
It is because the theory of non-valuation necessarily accompanies the 
theory of ideal-type. 
 It needs no elaboration that the theory of non-valuation is the 
natural conclusion to the cognition arising in answer to the above 
-mentioned establishment of the scientific subject. It is a strict warning 
given to the subject against its deviation into the arbitrary action and 
its commission of the self-deceit of limit-trespassing. In cultural 
 spheres where, in the process of the emancipation of the world from 
magic, are not so rationalized as in Europe and staying on either 
of those stages, through which Europe has passed up to the 
present, the actual results of European rationalization will become 
the reference material for passing a practical, evaluating judgment 
for the benefit of both such developmental formation of society 
and their attempted overtaking of Europe. This was already made 
clear in J. S. Mill's theory of policy as well, in which he said that 
backward nations world economically advance by imitating the economic 
systems of Britain and the United States of America, and Weber only 
replaced it with ethos, granting the latter an ideal-type significance. 
It is not to be forgotten that here as well the image of the world 
equally held by the modern Europeans has been presented distinctively. 
However, non-valuation will be truly requested in the future society 
of Europe. There will not be objectively set up the standard of 
evaluation such as will become guiding wires for empirical science. 
It may be held by each subjective body of action, but has been rejected 
in the premise of science. And when it is made an issue in empirical 
science, its practical evaluation will be eliminated and the significance 
of its empirical reality alone be asked. The political arguments of 
 empirical science will therefore be its contents only in the ideal-type 
sense. One who reads Weber's value-discussion or Wertdiskussion will 
be deeply impressed by the fact that he was thorough-going in his
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ideal-type interpretation of evalation. Thus the evaluation of various 
political arguments is to be determined by practical persons, but not 
the concern of a thinking scientist. As to the future society of Europe, 
therefore, there is only a coexistence of various kinds of policies, and 
for the decision among them there will be no altenative than resorting 
to practical disposal. Among races, as there is only an eternal conflict 
centering around an interest in the value of power, so nothing is found 
other than a conflct of real ability. It is an eternal conflict of Gods, 
as Weber said. As to the future of the capitalistic society, J. S. Mill, 
relying on a metaphysical idea of 'progress', attached his hope to the 
suspension of class conflicts in the 'stationary state'. Weber could 
not find guiding wires as Mill, and he could not approve anything 
like Mill's standpoint. Rather, his request was that the conflict 
should be accepted as fate and it should be watched and loved by the 
intellectual integrity of a modern individual and his conscience in action. 
In this regard too, he was certainly more thorough-going than Mill. 
 Thus considered, cognition of the social sciences in Weber is an 
accumulation of fragments in various senses. Regarding objects, social 
sciences exist unrelatedly varying with value ideas; regarding historical 
images, materialistic and idealistic system according to view-points 
existing simultaneously; regarding the different interests of subjective 
body, theory, history, and policy constituting independent fields res-
pectively. Those fragments are related to one another formally through 
the ideal-type=non-valuation idea system, but not related substantially. 
In short, the representation of reality as a related system will be 
categorically denied to the field of empirical science. A negative idea 
of methodology early indicated in his ceremonial appearance on the 
stage of the academic world, thus going so far as to be pessimistic, 
eventually bore fruit which is complacently contented with keeping to 
the sphere of an empirical scientist. This achievement can be attained 
only by a personality like Weber who embodies the ethos of Protes-
tantism, and its credit should be highly evaluated only in its connection 
with his subjective body. However, once the methodology, apart from 
Weber's personality, be adopted or feigned to be adopted and handled 
non-subjectively in theory itself, it would lose its proper value and 
become an idle rest garden for the social sciences of bourgeoistic 
category. The 'methodological individualism', as his methodology is 
sometimes renamed, is one example of this tendence. It is most 
necessary in the present age to prevent such a misunderstanding. And, 
if Weber's scientific theory is in danger of being subjected to such a 
misunderstanding, then his theory itself is partly to blame for it.
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 Lastly, mention will be made of one way of amending critically 
Weber's theory. For it, there is no other means but, awakening to 
the subjective=objebtivity of scientific cognition as mentioned in the 
introductory passages, to develop thoroughly his methodology along 
that line. In the case of Weber as well, as seen above, objectivity 
was necessarily united with the establishment of cogniging subject, 
and the subject was established by the outright retreat of an acting 
subjective body from its acting character. It that sense, his objectivity 
as well should have been considered in fact a sort of subjective= 
objectivity. Only the subjectivity was requested to disappear due to 
its complete lack of positive=affirmative meaning. The disappearance 
of subjectivity, in the case of Weber, was made possible only by the 
strong tension of ethical restraints. This should not be requested or 
may not be expected of all students of social sciences. That is respon-
sible for the danger of being falsified and distorted to which his theory 
is always subjected, There is a good reason for the fact that Weber 
tried to deny and extinguish the subjective body. It is because sub-
jective body was an individual in n the bourgeoistic society. Generally, 
the bourgeoistic society wants to split inself into individuals and bring 
to itself rational connection as the connection of their rational actions. 
So Weber considered that though scientific cognition is conducted by 
individual, to push the individual's subjectivity on the surface 
would not bring out an objecticely rational connection, but rather the 
objectivity of connection could be realized only by the denial of that 
subjectivity. But it will be accompanied by such defect as stated above. 
Thus considered, it follows that the theory of science will have no 
other means than to be determined not only by self-denial of sub-
jectivity, but denied again and determined affirmatively as one whose 
practice will lead the society to a higher stage. That the subjective 
body, which has been generalized formally as 'a thinking man' by 
one denial, is denied again means that it reterns to ' a willing man ' 
again ; and that man will not be a self-centered member in the bour-
geoistic socity who starts from self and reterns to self, but be a 
creative self which stands ready to start from itself and participate 
in the formation of the historical reality itself. That will not be 
individual in character, but also a self which goes on bearing whatever 
form of man's historical existence on his back as well as looking 
forward to the trends of historical reality on his way. Truly, an 
individual is nothing but a historical, relative existence. But, he will 
have the insight by which it may be transformed into a motive able 
to overcome the relativity by a full realisation. In a case of Weber,
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the relativity of subjective body was to be overcome by negatively 
retreating from various subjective and objective conditions surrounding 
it. Here, these things once denied were to be affirmed positively 
by being denied again so as to be transformed into a universal 
subjective body. If the subjectivity in this sense is obtained, it does 
not mean that the cognition, which appears along the line of 
subjective body, could not have the objectivity except in the sense 
of non-subjectivity, but that rather by the subjectification of the 
cognition bearing a positive value of subjective=objectivity, the 
subjective body will become the socially and historically objective 
body and thus participate in the developmental formation of social 
reality. Thus considered, the critical ammendment to Weber's 
scientific theory will be carried out only by the true establishment of 
subjectivity in cognition, And the logic for the purpose must be a 
dialectical logic which is epistemology and at the same time ontology.
